Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA by Elliott, E. Donald




Throughout EPA’s history, our greatest successes have occurred when policies, regula-
tions, and decisions are based on the results of sound and relevant scientific research
. . . . [T]he credibility of our decisions depends on the science underlying them. The
quality of the science behind those decisions largely determines how well environmental
programs actually work—whether they achieve our health and environmental goals.
—-Former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman1
I
INTRODUCTION
Most administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) pay
lip service to science, particularly during their confirmation hearings.  But the
truth is, despite recent reforms, the role of science at EPA still needs to be
strengthened.2  One incident that exemplifies the nature of the problem
occurred early in the Reagan Administration:  Shortly after taking office, then-
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch fired most of the scientists on EPA’s Sci-
ence Advisory Board to replace them with scientists who were good, solid
Republicans.3
The problem is not limited to one political party or ideological point of view.
EPA is truly bipartisan in its tendency to run roughshod over science to follow
the political winds.  For example, until recently EPA adhered to the scientifi-
cally discredited “no-threshold” hypothesis for carcinogens because the results
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1. Governor Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Remarks at the EPA Science Forum (May 1, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_050
102.htm.
2. See infra Part II.  See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).  The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was created
in 1970.  It is a relatively small agency in the executive branch, consisting of approximately 18,000
employees.  It is a free-standing agency in the sense that it is not part of any other department, but it is
not “independent” in the sense that its administrator is appointed by the President, continues to serve
at the pleasure of the President, and is confirmed by Senate.  While not formally a cabinet department,
under the last three presidential administrations, the EPA administrator has been invited to attend
cabinet meetings as an informal participant.  For further information about EPA’s structure and
history, see http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).
3. ANNE BURFORD & JOHN GREENYA, ARE YOU TOUGH ENOUGH? (1986).
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please environmentalists,4 and EPA sometimes refuses to acknowledge the
worldwide scientific consensus regarding global climate change because doing
so would displease conservatives.5  “Good science” is not a partisan issue, nor
does it favor industry over environmentalists.6  On the contrary, the modern
environmental movement was founded on the work of scientists such as Rachel
Carson who used science to challenge society to change its ways.7
Adam Smith once wrote: “[S]cience is the great antidote to the poison of
enthusiasm and superstition.”8  It is a bipartisan antidote, he might have added,
for science can correct the misguided enthusiasms and superstitions of either
the right or the left.  Recent waverings by EPA over whether to weaken the
arsenic standard for drinking water promulgated in the waning days of the
Clinton Administration show the importance of good science in holding the
Agency’s feet to the fire in the face of political opposition from industry.9  Good
science is not, as some have cynically suggested, merely in the eye of the
beholder, nor is it whatever technical information can be cobbled together to
support one’s predetermined position.10  Rather, when the system works prop-
erly, good science is a chorus of independent expert voices that come together
with sufficient coherence and force to constrain policy, structure debate, and
influence policy.  Rarely does good science dictate a unique policy outcome;
more often, it structures a policy dialogue among different disciplines and con-
stituencies by defining a problem and a range of options, but it may also figure
in the decision of which options to adopt.11
4. See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
5. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin and Katharine Q. Seelye, Report by E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A1.  For a recent example of the ongoing political con-
troversy over the causes of global climate change, see Paul Krugman, Rejecting the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2003, at A15 (“We can safely dismiss the idea that the right has carefully weighed the scientific
evidence [on climate change] and concluded that the overwhelming consensus of the scientific commu-
nity is wrong.”).
6. Eric Pianin, Moving Target on Policy Battlefield; Increasingly, “Science” Used by Proponents
and Critics to Score a Shot, WASH. POST, May 2, 2002, at A21.
7. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
8. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
V.1.1 (1776).
9. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Announces Arsenic Standard For
Drinking Water of 10 Parts per Billion (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/head
line_110101.htm.
10. Oliver A. Houck, Damage Control: A Field Guide to Important Euphemisms in Environmental
Law, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 130 (2001) (“‘Good Science.’ Under what circumstances is science
good?  When it supports your position.  No amount of science that supports the contrary qualifies . . .
because there is always more research to be conducted and because with enough digging you can scrape
up a scientist to disagree.”).
11. See MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT THE EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS
5-6 (1999) (“The uses of science in environmental policy are many, including ‘reality definition,’ agenda
setting, setting the terms of debate, political weaponry and decisionmaking.”).
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II
WHAT THIS ARTICLE IS AND IS NOT ABOUT
This Article considers the problem of institutional reforms to enhance the
role of science in EPA decisionmaking.  This is an important problem, but it is
not the only issue relating to science at EPA that might be considered.  To
avoid misunderstanding, it may be important to define at the outset what this
Article is not about.  This Article is not concerned with the nature of science,
whether all scientists must agree, whether science is “objective,” nor even, for
that matter, whether science actually exists.  Those are fine philosophical ques-
tions that many other articles discuss at length.  This Article adopts as a starting
point, however, the common sense perspective that there is some coherence, if
not unanimity, to scientific thought on some issues of relevance to environ-
mental policy.  It then considers how to reform institutions so that existing sci-
entific coherence will have a greater influence on policy.
This Article is also not concerned with making the case that the role of sci-
ence at EPA should be enhanced.  In another essay (which may be read as a
companion piece to this one), I have made the case that science should have an
enhanced role in EPA decisionmaking.12  That conclusion is based in no small
part on my own observations and experiences during the two years that I served
as EPA general counsel during the late 1980s and early 1990s and during my
twenty-five years of participating in EPA policy deliberations as a practicing
environmental lawyer.  My personal observation was that science did not play a
significant role in the policymaking conversation at EPA during the years that I
was there, and I do not believe that has changed much in subsequent admini-
strations.  In my experience, scientific issues were rarely mentioned, and very
few of the participants in the policymaking dialogue at high levels within the
Agency were scientifically trained.
The observation that science is conspicuously absent from internal EPA
deliberations is consistent with every significant case study of EPA decisions of
which I am aware.  All of them, no matter the author’s political predilections,
observe that science is, at most, a peripheral concern that may define a range of
options, but rarely figures significantly in the final decision regarding which
options to select.13  As Georgetown University Law Center Professor Steve
Goldberg observes: “[R]egulatory agencies are regularly accused of being ‘cap-
tured’ by industry, consumer groups, members of Congress, or bureaucratic
12. E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,125 (Jan. 2001) (writing about the “science debacle” at EPA).
13. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR
HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL
PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981); MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS
& STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG
QUESTIONS (1990); JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL
TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES (1996); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Sci-
ence, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103
(2001).
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inertia.  They are never accused, however, of being captured by scientists.”14
While I favor strengthening science’s voice in EPA decisions, I am not an
imperialist for science.  I do not believe that science alone should determine
policy, nor that regulation should always wait until science is clear.15  I merely
believe that science is underrepresented in policymaking at EPA today and that
the quality of decisions at the margins would be improved by giving science
somewhat greater influence.  Admittedly, this opinion is not universally
shared,16 but recently, the courts have reversed some EPA decisions for a lack of
good scientific underpinnings, and the National Academy of Sciences and both
houses of Congress have been actively considering measures to increase the role
of science at EPA.17  Thus, the problem of how those of us outside the Agency
might enhance the voices for science inside the Agency is neither trivial nor
hypothetical.
It also seems to me to be a problem with broader theoretical ramifications.
One of the central, unresolved problems of the administrative state in the
United States is how to meld politics and expertise so that neither overwhelms
the other.18  EPA is perhaps the most important of the regulatory agencies that
use science, and yet it has a dismal reputation as a science agency.19  So it is not
a trivial problem to consider what can be done to enhance the role of science at
EPA.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this Article adopts the perspective
of what those of us outside the Agency can do to increase the extent to which
the voices of science are heard in decisionmaking at EPA.  There are a host of
other reforms that could be implemented if one happened to be EPA adminis-
trator.  For example, every EPA administrator has a daily personal staff meet-
ing.  Every EPA administrator I know of has invited his or her general counsel
and his or her political adviser to be present at his or her daily personal staff
meeting, thereby symbolizing that law and politics have a seat at the table.  I
know of only one administrator (Lee Thomas), however, who met regularly
with his science advisor (Bernie Goldstein).  During Thomas’s administration,
science played a much stronger role in Agency deliberations than it does today.
In government, proximity to power often creates both the appearance and the
14. Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341,
1365 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Gail Charnley &  E. Donald Elliott, Democratization of Risk Analysis, in HUMAN
AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1399 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002); Gail Charnley & E.
Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and Public Health Protection, 32 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363 (Mar. 2002); E. Donald Elliott, Global Climate Change and Regulatory
Uncertainty, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 259 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119
(2003).
17. See BURFORD & GREENYA, supra note 3; infra Part III.A.
18. See Elliott et al., supra note 12; see also McGarity, supra note 13.
19. For a recent article collecting numerous examples, see James W. Conrad Jr., The Reverse Sci-
ence Charade, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,306 (Apr. 2003).  The criticisms of EPA for distort-
ing science are bipartisan.  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 13.
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reality of power.  If I were the EPA administrator, I would definitely include
my science advisor in this “power breakfast.”  Doing so would enhance the
extent to which the Agency’s top leadership would hear a scientific perspective
on policy issues.  More importantly, it would send a symbolic message through-
out the Agency—and to all those outside the Agency who seek to influence it—
that science is an important part of the policy conversation that goes on in the
administrator’s office.  But that is an article for another day.  For the moment,
my concern is how those of us outside the Agency can enhance the role of sci-
ence in internal EPA decisionmaking.
III
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND WHY JUDICIAL REVIEW
CANNOT SOLVE IT
Elsewhere I have described the root of the problem with the role of science
at EPA today as the “triumph of politics.”  I have pointed out that very few
knowledgeable persons would contend that our environmental decisions today
are too much dominated by neutral scientific expertise and do not reflect
enough politics.20  Administrative agencies were created in the United States, at
least in part, to supplant legalistic common-law decisions by injecting more
“politics and expertise” into the system.21  Unfortunately, however, the first
generation of administrative lawyers spoke of “politics and expertise” as if they
were a single compound noun, and never really unraveled the tensions between
the two.22  One of the central problems in United States administrative law is
structuring the creative tension between politics and expertise.  The challenge is
to meld the two so that scientists and politicians work together to produce poli-
cies that are better than either would produce on their own.  No one contends
that science should replace or dominate politics.  Rather, the issue is how to
ensure that each plays a substantial role without overwhelming the other.  My
belief is that there is currently too much politics and not enough science in our
environmental decisions, or, as my mentor at EPA, former administrator
William Reilly, used to put it: “I wish that we at the EPA had the analytic rigor
to match our enthusiasm.”  I have considered the alternative of trying to insu-
late EPA somewhat more from political influences, so that it might reflect neu-
tral technocratic expertise to a greater extent.  But in view of the great impor-
tance and economic impact of the decisions EPA makes, and the nature of our
democratic system, I do not believe that it is practical to weaken the political
influences on EPA.  The goal, therefore, must be to strengthen the scientific
20. An exception to this general principle is if science is immature and has little to contribute to the
policy conversation and, therefore, decisions should be made based on default principles, such as the
“precautionary principle.”  See supra note 15; see also Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary
Principle?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,790 (July 2001).  For an example of reduced evidentiary
burdens when science is immature, see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21. See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
22. Id.
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ones.
Some agencies achieve the goal of melding science and policy considerations
tolerably well—or at least, far better than EPA does.  For example, while the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is criticized for many things, it is
almost never criticized for getting the science wrong, and EPA is almost never
praised for getting the science right!
There are a number of significant differences between FDA and EPA.  One
particularly pertinent one is that FDA decisions are rarely challenged in court—
and they are almost never successfully challenged—while virtually all EPA deci-
sions go to court, and they are often remanded.  This has led to what Professor
Wendy Wagner has aptly named the “science charade” at EPA: Decisions
reached on political grounds are often rationalized on scientific ones, because
the courts defer more to the Agency when it successfully mystifies its decisions
by wrapping them in the mantle of science. 23  This phenomenon is really just a
straightforward application of the economic theory of supply and demand.
Other things being equal, repealing a tax increases the supply of a good by
decreasing its price.  Similarly, if courts promise greater deference to Agency
decisions based on science24 (that is, they lower the expected cost), one should
find a “reasons-displacement effect”25 at the margins to increase the supply of
science-based Agency rationales.
While the incentives created by judicial review do have some effect, in my
view, the causes of the lamentable position of science at EPA lie deeper in
EPA’s organization, structure, and traditions than the incentives created by
judicial review.  For the same reasons, I am skeptical that an episodic external
factor such as judicial review can have much real effect on issues as fundamen-
tal as the relative role of science in agency decisions.  Many administrative law-
yers turn instinctively to changing standards of judicial review as a cure-all for
whatever ills they perceive to ail agencies (thereby bringing to mind the old
adage: “When you’re a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”).  A good exam-
ple is Alan Raul’s proposal in this Symposium for “regulatory Daubert.”26
Raul’s proposal would fundamentally alter the relationships between agencies
and reviewing courts.  Traditionally, courts reviewing agency decisions do not
rule on the admissibility of individual items of evidence, but rather review the
record as a whole to ensure that an agency’s decision has reasonable factual
support on the record as a whole.27  While Raul would apparently alter this def-
23. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613
(1995).
24. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
25. For empirical evidence that a change in the law increasing judicial deference does in fact result
in a “reasons displacement effect” so that more agency decisions are rationalized on the basis that has
been promised greater judicial deference, see Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
26. Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer,  “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judi-
cial Review of Agency Science By Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Autumn 2003).
27. See Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Administrative Procedure Act
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erential standard, I doubt that even this fundamental change in the standards
for judicial review would actually do much to strengthen the role of science at
EPA.
Judicial review can have a powerful effect on a particular case or policy, but,
for a host of reasons, the signals emanating from the judiciary are too episodic,
confused, and inconsistent to have much of a systematic effect on reforming
agency practices.  As Professors Mashaw, Merrill, and Shane observe in their
administrative law casebook, judicial scrutiny is “intermittent” and “the ulti-
mate effects of judicial review are quite unpredictable at the time of decision.”28
That is not to say, however, that I would be opposed to any and all modifica-
tions of judicial review to strengthen the role of science.  For example, in the
case of collegial agencies such as EPA that meld different disciplinary strands
such as politics and science, I would consider modifying the so-called “Morgan
rule” that reviewing courts do not go behind an agency’s written decision to
inquire into the mental processes of decisionmakers.29  It seems bizarre that
courts must defer to an EPA decision based on the Agency’s alleged scientific
“expertise” if all the scientists at the Agency opposed the decision on the sci-
ence but were overruled by the politicians.  In deciding how much deference to
give an agency decision based on alleged expertise, a court should be entitled to
know whether the particular decision is grounded on science or policy.  The
outcome in Morgan is understandable on its facts: the court wanted to avoid
exposing how little the Secretary of Agriculture personally knew about the deci-
sions that were made in his name, and perhaps it also desired to protect the con-
fidentiality of deliberative advice.  But respecting those principles does not have
to lead us to ignore the debates between disciplines that go on inside agencies.
In other areas, we have managed to survive putting into the public record the
changes made to proposed EPA rules by economists and policy analysts at the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), although admittedly these
changes do not become part of the record for judicial review.30  When the scien-
tists at EPA, such as the Science Advisory Board, have refused to approve the
Agency’s scientific rationale, a court should consider that refusal in giving lesser
deference to the Agency’s decision.31  That simple change in existing law would
be at least as effective and far more consistent with traditional administrative
law principles than Alan Raul’s radical proposal for “regulatory Daubert.”
While some changes in judicial review could be marginally helpful in
increasing the authority of science inside EPA, more effective reform of the
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
28. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 799-800 (4th ed. 1998).
29. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (holding that the court’s function was not
to inquire into the mental processes of the Secretary of Agriculture).
30. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (2000).
31. But see Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1034 (1982) (declining to require EPA to obtain second review and approval from Clean Air Science
Advisory Committee after changes were made in response to its initial non-concurrence).
010904 ELLIOTT.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
52 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:45
role of science at EPA must be based on more basic—and more mundane—
reforms at the level of Agency structure and procedure.
IV
THREE PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE VOICE FOR SCIENCE AT EPA
In this Part, I outline three proposals to strengthen the role of science in
decisions at EPA.  The theoretical preconceptions that underlie these proposals
are thoroughly conventional.  With the consensus of academic opinion, I adopt
the interest-group-representation model of administrative behavior and
presume that agencies respond to political pressure from external constituen-
cies, but I also assume that the internal structures and arrangements inside an
agency do matter.32  These two premises may at first appear inconsistent, but in
fact they are not.  External political pressures ebb and flow.  In response to a
series of particularly obvious failures to follow the counsel of science, there
today may be a temporary political outcry to improve the role of science at
EPA, but it will soon pass as other issues take center stage.  One of the key
challenges of institutional design is to ride the temporary wave of political sup-
port to build structures both inside and outside of the Agency that will continue
to push for good science after that political groundswell has abated.  Most struc-
tures of government (including EPA itself) are the longer-lasting products of
such ephemeral impulses of political energy.  Those movements that succeed at
continuing to influence government over time are those that refuse to be
bought off by a few evanescent press releases or political gestures, but instead
obtain structural and institutional changes that can continue to push the goals of
the movement after its political energy has ebbed.  My recommendations can be
thought of as strategies for perpetuating the current political energy for the
reform of science at EPA into more abiding structures that will continue to be
institutional advocates for good science inside and outside of the Agency after
the current political focus on good science has passed on to other issues.  In
other words, just as biological structures reflect past environmental conditions,
Agency institutional structures embody past external political environments.
Much of the art of government consists of creating institutional reifications
for particular policies and interests inside the government to embody political
movements and convert them into abiding institutional structures.  Thus, for
example, EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice was created to argue for, and
to represent, the interest of environmental justice inside the Agency, and it
draws support from organized constituencies that represent the interests of
environmental justice outside the Agency.  I argue that science needs a similar
32. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1762
(1975) (“The problem of administrative procedure is to provide representation to all affected inter-
ests.”). For a summary of theories about the relationship between agency structure and the political
environment, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998).  For a good summary of the academic literature on the interest-group repre-
sentation model of the administrative process, see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 345-51 (10th ed. 2003).
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support structure, with both internal and external interest groups that represent
and agitate for the values of science.
No theory of political change as to how to actually bring these reforms to
fruition is proposed; for now, these outcomes are merely defined as desirable
end-states.  My recommendations are: (A) create a high-level advocate for sci-
ence, (B) empower scientists to make policy recommendations, and (C) create a
“Science Watch” nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) to represent science
in the administrative process.
A.  Create a High-Level Advocate for Science
One of the most important things that could be done immediately to
improve the role of science at EPA is to create a high-level advocate for sci-
ence.  A “chief science officer” should be created with a mandate to ensure that
the Agency’s actions abide by minimum standards of scientific integrity.  Bills to
do just that are currently pending in both the House and Senate.33  The National
Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) recently recommended creation of an EPA
deputy administrator for science:
Just as the advice of the Agency’s legal counsel is relied upon by the administrator to
determine whether a proposal is “legal,” an appropriately qualified and adequately
empowered science official is needed to attest to the administrator and the nation that
the proposed action is “scientific”—that it is consistent, or at least not inconsistent,
with available scientific knowledge . . . .”34
I support these proposals for reasons that I have stated at length elsewhere.35
One can reasonably disagree with the NAS over the details of whether the
chief science officer should be at the deputy administrator level, an under secre-
tary in a new cabinet-level EPA, or a new “general counsel for science,” analo-
gous to the “general counsel for law.”  The important idea, however, is to have
a permanent, high-level advocate for scientific rigor in the policy debates at
EPA.
In an attempt to moot these pending legislative proposals to create a deputy
administrator for science, then-EPA Administrator Christie Whitman recently
33. On April 30, 2002, the House unanimously passed H.R. 64 to create a new deputy administra-
tor for science and technology at EPA.  According to its chief sponsor, Representative Vern Ehlers, the
only professional research scientist serving in Congress:
The bill creates a new Deputy Administrator for Science and Technology at the EPA.  This
position would be equal in rank to the current Deputy Administrator and would report
directly to the Administrator of the EPA.  The new Deputy will be responsible for coordinat-
ing scientific research among the scientific and regulatory arms of the Agency and ensure that
sound science is used in regulatory decisions. The bill would also convert the position of Assis-
tant Administrator at the Office of Research and Development to Chief Scientist, who would
serve a five-year term.
Press Release, Ehlers Successful in Providing Sound Science to EPA (Apr. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.house.gov/ehlers/press_releases/HR64.htm.
34. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND PEER-REVIEW PRACTICES 7 (2000).
35. S.159, A Bill to Elevate the EPA to a Cabinet Level Department: Hearing Before the United
States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Hearing on
S.159] (testimony of E. Donald Elliott).
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gave the title “science advisor” to the head of EPA’s existing Office of
Research and Development (“ORD”).36  This alternative approach was specifi-
cally considered and rejected as inadequate by the NAS panel.37  NAS cited two
basic reasons:  First, the NAS panel felt that it was a full-time job for the head
of ORD to administer EPA’s research program, which now spends roughly half
a billion dollars a year.38  Second, the NAS panel felt that one assistant adminis-
trator at EPA would find it difficult to question the policies advocated by
another assistant administrator who runs a program office such as Air, Water or
Waste.39  A third possible reason, which was perhaps unspoken, is that the skills
and background that qualify one to administer a half-billion-dollar-a-year scien-
tific research effort are not necessarily the same as those that qualify one for
bureaucratic infighting over proposed Agency policy initiatives, and the two
skill sets are rarely found in the same person.
I agree with the NAS’s objections, including the unspoken one, and accord-
ingly consider Administrator Whitman’s recent press release to lie somewhere
between a gesture and a half-step forward.40  Although inadequate, the positive
aspects of giving the additional title of “science advisor” to the new “assistant
administrator for ORD,” the traditional title of EPA’s highest-ranking science
official, should not be overlooked.  Nomenclature can be important because it
helps to define roles and expectations.  “Assistant administrator for the Office
of Research and Development,” carries an unfortunate implication that science
is relevant only to the Agency’s program of research, and that therefore the
assistant administrator for ORD has no business interfering with the ongoing
program of regulatory development being conducted by other offices.  None-
36. As an EPA press release reports:
EPA Administrator Christie Whitman announced on May 24, 2002 that, in order to strengthen
the role of science at the Agency, she has appointed Dr. Paul Gilman to be the Agency’s Sci-
ence Advisor.  Dr. Gilman was recently sworn in as EPA’s Assistant Administrator of the
Office of Research and Development (ORD), responsible for coordination and strategic
planning for the Agency’s ongoing scientific research efforts.  ‘I am pleased to announce that
Paul Gilman will officially serve as my Science Advisor,’ said Whitman.  ‘In this capacity, he
will be responsible for working across the Agency to ensure that the highest quality science is
better integrated into the Agency’s programs, policies and decisions.  I am certain that under
Paul’s leadership, we are embarking on a new era at the EPA—one where our commitment to
the quality and relevance of science is greater than ever before.’  As Science Advisor, Gilman
will be charged with ensuring that the Agency draws on the best science to support policy
development and decision making as EPA fulfills its mission of protecting human health and
the environment, ensuring a good quality of life for the American people.  Specifically,
Gilman will work closely with Administrator Whitman’s Regulatory Development and Task
Force Review on science issues, review policies and procedures related to the Science Advi-
sory Board, recommend options to improve the Integrated Risk Information System and
develop recommendations regarding the role of EPA Regional Laboratories.  Prior to joining
EPA, Gilman has held numerous senior positions in both government and private industry
where he has been involved in science policy development and research.
Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Whitman Appoints Gilman Science Advisor (May
24, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/ord/htm/sci-advi.htm.
37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 36.
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theless, a few of the previous incumbents of this office have managed to have a
significant, if sporadic, effect on policy, largely through force of personality and
a close relationship with the administrator.  By giving the head of ORD the title
of “science advisor,” the Administrator Whitman was perhaps validating a
somewhat broader role for a science advocate in policy deliberations within the
Agency.  However, if one reads the announcement closely, the text stops just
short of actually giving the “science advisor” a mandate to question the science
underlying initiatives by other program offices.  Just as the title was bestowed in
an instant by the stroke of the Administrator’s pen, so too could it be taken
away.  Or, more likely, the title could simply not be renewed in the next admini-
stration, after the legislative furor over increasing the role of science at EPA
abates.
For these reasons, I continue to favor legislating a permanent, high-level
“chief science officer” at EPA.  That position could be adapted to build on and
strengthen some important reforms in the role of science at EPA that were
accomplished during the last eight years under the Clinton-Gore-Browner
Administration.41  A quiet revolution in the role of science at EPA has been
accomplished through the expanded role of peer review under Executive Order
12,866.42  In part to stave off more draconian proposals for expanded peer
review in the Republican-backed “regulatory reform” bills, the Clinton Admini-
stration in the Order mandated that agencies, including EPA, institute peer-
review policies.43
Under EPA’s peer-review policy, virtually all important scientific questions
now receive peer review by panels of independent, outside scientists.44  In my
view, expanding peer review is a very important reform.  Like my mentor,
Judge David Bazelon, I have long had more faith in peer review than in the
ability of “scientifically illiterate judges” to penetrate the details of highly tech-
nical and scientific decisions.45  In my experience, EPA’s outside peer-review
panels generally do an excellent job of identifying the hidden issues that often
underlie the treatment of scientific questions by the program offices.  Unfortu-
41. EPA’s website describes the recent reforms in the role of science at the Agency as follows:
Over the past 4 years, ORD [EPA’s Office of Research and Development] has taken major
steps to ensure that it carries out a program of sound science to inform Agency decisions
without allowing regulatory objectives to distort scientific findings or analyses. These steps
have included open, transparent, and peer-reviewed research planning; competitively awarded
extramural research grants; independent peer review of ORD science publications, assess-
ments, and documents; and rigorous peer review of ORD’s research laboratories and centers.
OFFICE OF SCI. POLICY, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ROLE OF SCIENCE AT EPA, at
http://www.epa.gov/osp/science.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2003).
42. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
43. Id.
44. See Memorandum from Carol Browner, to Assistant Administrators, Re: Peer Review Program
(June 7, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/OSP/spc/memo0607.htm.  EPA’s current policies and
procedures for peer review are summarized in OFFICE OF SCIENCE POLICY, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK (EPA 100-B-00-001) (2d ed. 2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/OSP/spc/prhandbk.pdf.
45. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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nately, however, these excellent peer-review documents may not always receive
all the attention and follow-through that they deserve.  To state the problem
more precisely, the peer reviews now come back to the very same program
offices generating the documents that the reviewers are questioning; and, as
often as not, the excellent comments and questions raised by peer reviewers are
essentially ignored by EPA in developing final rules.  In other words, peer
review is a paper tiger.
To close the circuit, and to improve the weight that peer reviews receive in
EPA’s deliberations, the peer reviews should come back to the staff of the chief
science officer and to OMB, as well as to the program office, for an independent
review.  When the chief science officer feels that peer reviewers have raised
substantial points that have not been sufficiently answered by the program
offices proposing the new rule, the chief science officer should have sufficient
standing with the administrator to stop the process and raise questions at the
highest levels.  This internal process would be analogous to one that EPA itself
fulfills externally when reviewing other agencies’ proposed regulations and
when drafting environmental impact statements.46
Creating a new high-level advocate for science is particularly important in
light of recent reforms that have literally taken scientists out of the loop for
most rulemakings.  Until recently, EPA maintained a quaint institution called
“red border review,” under which a proposed rule was circulated for comment
to all of the offices before it was a sent to the administrator’s office for signa-
ture.47  This system provided one final opportunity for members of the Agency
other than those that had originally drafted the rule to review and question it.48
It was rare that one of the media program offices would question a rule drafted
by another of the media offices, but it did occasionally occur.  More frequently,
however, the economists at what was then the Office of Policy Planning and
Evaluation,49 or the lawyers at the Office of General Counsel or Enforcement,
and sometimes even the scientists at ORD would question the basis for a rule or
other action that one of the program offices was proposing during this internal
review period.
During the Clinton Administration, this process of broad internal review at
EPA was eliminated, allegedly to streamline the process.50  Today, a program
46. See Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2000).
47. See JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1976).
48. Id.
49. This office is now called the Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation.  For a chronology of
the changes in the name of this office at EPA, see http://www.epa.gov/history/org/ao/opr/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
50. See, e.g., NAT’L ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVTL. POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EFFLUENT GUIDELINES TASK FORCE:
REMOVING THE BOTTLENECKS FROM THE EFFLUENT GUIDELINES PROCESS (Oct. 1996), at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/guide/taskforce/bottleneck.html (“The historical EPA process for Agency-wide
review and sign-off of regulations appears to be a problem due to the need to obtain consensus from all
participants, and sometimes because of an excessive number of participants.  This contributes to delays
and frequent last-minute “fire drills” to obtain consensus.”); see also Hearing on S.159, supra note 35
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office with only the concurrence of Office of General Counsel can take its rule
directly to the administrator for signature.  The economists and scientists no
longer have a chance to question it.  To be sure, those other offices may have
participants on the staff-level working group that drafts the proposed rule in the
first place.  But high-level review by scientists and economists at a political level
inside the Agency has been eliminated.  A chief science officer would put a
“scientific reality check” back into the process, just as final review by the gen-
eral counsel builds a “legal reality check” into the process.
Another problem with today’s peer-review process is that peer review is
essentially a quality control process that generally takes place after the Agency
has made up its mind on the main outlines of what it is going to do.  To be effec-
tive, quality control must be built into the front-end of the process, rather than
“inspected in” at the end of the line.51  Similarly, science needs to be involved
early in the decisionmaking process in addition to being a quality-control con-
straint at the end.52  As I discuss in more detail in subpart C, a science advocate
inside the Agency will be more powerful and effective if he or she can draw
support from an external constituency or stakeholder.53
B.  Empower Scientists to Make Policy Recommendations
It has become a canon of institutional faith at EPA that scientists should just
stick to the facts and not make policy recommendations.  This strong separation
between science and policy may be attributable in part to the analytic distinc-
tion between “risk assessment” and “risk management” that has been pro-
pounded by, among others, William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first administrator and
one of its key intellectual leaders. 54
Whatever its source, there is a strong cultural difference between the role of
science at EPA and the role of science at many other agencies such as FDA.  At
other agencies, scientists speak with their greatest authority on scientific issues,
but they are invited to make recommendations on policy issues as well.55  This
(remarks of E. Donald Elliott and Carol M. Browner).
51. E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Exectuive Order 12,291
Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177-
79 (Spring 1994).
52. See infra text accompanying note 60.
53. Cf. William Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975)
(arguing that lawyers inside EPA derive power from the threat of reversal by the courts).
54. See, e.g., William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,190
(1984); see also PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK
ASSESSMENT, FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT (1997).
55. For example, the charter of the Science Advisory Board at FDA is a broad one: “The Science
Advisory Board advises the Commissioner in discharging her responsibilities as they relate to address-
ing specific and technically complex scientific issues of regulatory importance to FDA.”  U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., CHARTER, SCIENCE BOARD TO THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/charter.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).  But the stated mission of
EPA’s Science Advisory Board is much narrower: “Congress established the EPA Science Advisory
Board in 1978 and gave it a broad mandate to advise the Agency on technical matters.  The Board’s
principal mission includes . . . [r]eviewing the quality and relevance of the scientific and technical infor-
mation being used or proposed as the basis for Agency regulations.”  U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
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rarely happens at EPA, where scientists are usually told to stick to the science
and to leave policy decisions to others.  For example, EPA’s Science Advisory
Board rarely makes policy recommendations to the administrator, usually con-
fining itself instead to reviewing and commenting on “purely scientific” ques-
tions.  It is true that some important policy decisions at EPA are made by scien-
tists—for example, what uncertainty factors to use in performing risk
assessments.56  But, ironically, scientists have seized control of these policy deci-
sions precisely by embedding them in a highly scientific discourse and denying
that they are really policy decisions at all.
Whatever utility there may be to an analytic distinction between risk assess-
ment and risk management—between science and policy—it is an organiza-
tional disaster to exclude scientists from policy conversations.  The organiza-
tional theory that calls for a strict separation between science and policy
marginalizes science and prevents it from playing its proper role in informing
good policy.  The EPA norm that scientists should be seen but not heard on
policy issues causes more harm than good in several ways.
Most people enjoy exercising power.57  The same can be said for scientists.
Good scientists do not come to work for regulatory agencies in the federal gov-
ernment because of high prestige, or high salary, or great working conditions, or
terrific research opportunities.  They are drawn to regulatory agency work for
the same reasons that lawyers or economists are drawn there, and primary
among them is the chance to contribute to making what they consider to be
good public policy.  In other words, a chance to exercise power—or at least to
advise the powerful—is one of the top motivations to attracting good people to
public service.
When we attempt to consign scientists to a Dragnet-style, “just the facts”
role in the policy process, we undermine one of the primary incentives for quali-
fied scientists to join regulatory agencies.  By telling scientists that their policy
recommendations are unwelcome, we deter good people, and we forego the
benefit of the good ideas they might have suggested.
Moreover, the edict of purging policy from science is self-defeating.  Science
and policy merge almost imperceptibly into one another.  If told that it is
improper to make policy recommendations, scientific groups are much more
likely to smuggle in their policy predilections covertly, either consciously or
unconsciously.  We would be far better advised to invite scientific advisory
bodies to separate their scientific conclusions from their policy recommenda-
tions, and to empower them to address both.  This is the approach followed by
EPA Science Advisory Board, at http://www.epa.gov/science1/index.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003)
(emphasis added).  The language reflects the practice of the two agencies.  At FDA, scientists often
make policy recommendations, whereas at EPA they do so far less often.
56. See, e.g., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC., CHOICES IN RISK ASSESSMENT:
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE POLICY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS (Steven
Milloy project manager, 1994).
57. “A sense of power is the most intoxicating stimulant a mortal can enjoy.” CAROLINA L. HUNT,
THE LIFE OF ELLEN H. RICHARDS ch. 11 (1912) (quoting Ellen Henrietta Swallow Richards).
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FDA and many other agencies, and it seems to work well.
C.  Organize a “Science Watch” NGO to Represent Disinterested Scientists in
the Administrative Process
Disinterested scientists are a discrete and insular minority that is
systematically underrepresented in the present administrative process.58  “The
present political system of environmental regulation is highly sensitive to
certain voices (well-organized, technically sophisticated pressure groups,
including environmentalists . . . ), but other voices without a lobby are largely
left out of the dialogue (disadvantaged economic and racial minorities,
disinterested scientists).”59
Of course, individual scientists are sometimes hired to speak on behalf of
industry or environmental groups or other interested parties. But, for the
moment, I am concerned with voicing the views of disinterested scientists—
those who have no financial stake in the controversy and whose only interest is
the scientific integrity of the process.  Independent scientists are sometimes
asked to serve on peer-review bodies such as EPA’s Science Advisory Board, or
NAS committees.  But these reviewing institutions, useful as they are, typically
become involved only late in the process to bless or criticize an EPA policy that
has already largely taken shape.60  They also generally respond to questions that
are posed to them by others and do not play a creative role in defining and
shaping policy options.  Nor can they avail themselves of many levers of power
for influencing the administrative process, such as lobbying Congress, the White
House, and agency officials, filing comments, litigating, or issuing press releases.
Because they lack an economic stake in the outcome, groups of independent
scientists rarely hire lawyers, participate as stakeholders, write comments, lobby
Congress, or sue to challenge rules that offend their sense of scientific integrity.
Nor do independent scientists do any of the other things that other interest
groups representing other perspectives do to try to influence the administrative
process.  They do not do so precisely because they are not organized as an inter-
est group and they do not have a sufficient financial interest in the outcome of
the controversy for them to incur the very substantial transaction and process
costs required to participate in the administrative process.  The absence of an
institutional stakeholder for science who can use the same techniques other
interest groups use creates a fundamental imbalance of power.
The absence of independent scientists as an organized interest group leaves
a void in our administrative process and biases outcomes.  The prevailing
58. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76
(1980); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 722-24 (1985).
59. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE
NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 170 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds.
1997) (emphasis added).
60. NAT’L ENVTL. POLICY INST., ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF SCIENCE
IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 17-18 (1996) (advocating more “early peer involvement” as opposed to
limiting peer review to the end of the process).
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modern vision of public participation in the administrative process is based on
interest group pluralism, in which “interested parties” (revealing words) com-
pete in a marketplace of ideas.61  Thus, in a typical administrative proceeding to
set an environmental standard, someone speaks for the regulated industry, for
the environment, for local and state governments, and for small businesses.  No
one speaks for science qua science.  Science is typically only heard when it hap-
pens to support the position of one of these organized interests groups.  Inde-
pendent, disinterested scientists are literally unrepresented in the process.
Perhaps it is time for science qua science to get into the game by organizing
a nongovernmental organization of independent environmental scientists whose
only common interest is speaking up for the integrity of science in the process.
For purposes of discussion, I will call this imaginary new entity “Science
Watch.”  The Science Watch NGO might be composed of an independent, self-
perpetuating board of directors who are eminent and experienced scientists.
They should be empowered to decide which controversies Science Watch will
engage in and what positions it will take.  They could hire legal counsel, lobby-
ists, and public relations firms to make their points, just as environmental advo-
cacy groups not only file comments and lawsuits but also run newspaper ads to
influence public perception and debate on environmental issues.62  My point is
not that running issue ads is inappropriate (although they do tend to oversim-
plify), but rather that independent scientists do not currently run counter-ads,
thereby leaving the field susceptible to extreme claims by both industry and
environmentalists, both of whom may have an axe to grind.  To avoid claims of
bias, Science Watch would, like many environmental NGOs, be funded entirely
by a diverse group of foundations.  Moreover, adapting an idea recently pro-
posed by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres in the context of campaign finance
reform, the decisionmakers at Science Watch should be kept in the dark regard-
ing the identity of their funders and what those funders’ stakes in the outcome
of decisions might be.63
The initial board of Science Watch would face a number of important deci-
sions:  Should they engage on the “hard issues” on which scientific consensus is
not yet formed, or should they focus on issues on which a scientific consensus
has begun to arise?  Should they denounce abuses of science or provide wise
counsel on the difficult issues?  In principle, these issues are no different than
those faced by the boards of Environmental Defense Fund or the ACLU when
they decide where to deploy their scarce resources to best further the interests
that they represent.  The main point, however, is that many values and perspec-
61. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667
(1975).
62. For example, see the series of newspaper ads on the alleged effect of toxic chemicals on chil-
dren’s health at http://www.childenvironment.org (last visited June 1, 2002), or the many efforts to
influence press coverage undertaken by the Environmental Working Group at http://www.ewg.org (last
visited Jan. 16, 2003).
63. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 26-30 (2002).
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tives, such as protecting the environment, protecting civil liberties, or reducing
the influence of money in politics were once unrepresented (or at least, under-
represented) in the policy process.  Science finds itself largely in that same
situation today, without any group that systematically represents the value of
scientific accuracy and integrity in the policy process.  Perhaps founding a Sci-
ence Watch NGO is no less realistic than founding the ACLU, Common Cause,
or Greenpeace once seemed.
It should also be remembered that professional societies have traditionally
fulfilled similar roles as independent voices for a profession or discipline.  For
example, for many years the American Psychiatric Association has filed amicus
briefs in numerous court cases involving mental health issues.64  Perhaps profes-
sional scientific societies in the environmental area such as the Society for Risk
Analysis, the Society for Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, or the Air
and Waste Management Association should become more involved as direct
participants in EPA proceedings.  They would act as independent voices for sci-
entific rigor and integrity.  The Society of Toxicology already issues occasional
position statements reacting to governmental actions and public perceptions on
issues of science.65  Perhaps we now need to take a further step by creating a
new Science Watch NGO consisting of independent scientists—with motiva-
tions and credentials beyond question—who are prepared not only to speak out
occasionally on important issues of science in environmental regulation, but
also to take more active measures to influence the regulatory process.
The objections to such an organization are obvious.  Who can be so auda-
cious as to purport to speak for science?  Will science not lose its moral author-
ity if it becomes an interest group just like all the others?  Who would fund such
an organization?  Since scientists cannot agree on anything, would not whatever
position this group takes be misleading?  All of these objections have some
merit, and would have to be accommodated, but they all also can be answered,
at least to some extent, if one substitutes the word “environment” and its cog-
nates for “science” in the questions above.  Other NGOs representing equally
abstract values and diverse constituencies manage to exist and to influence
policy successfully.66  And even when science has no definitive answers to offer,
it can still contribute by clarifying uncertainties and exposing misstatements as
to what is and is not known.
64. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2003) (citing Brief for American Psychiat-
ric Association as Amicus Curiae); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997) (same); Young-
berg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1982) (same).
65. See, e.g., Society of Toxicology, Position Paper, The Safety of Genetically Modified Foods Pro-
duced Through Biotechnology (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.toxicology.org/Information/
GovernmentMedia/GM_Food.html.
66. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union is committed to protecting the Bill of Rights.
http://www.aclu.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).  Common Cause “regularly publishes investigative
studies on the effects of money in politics and reports on a variety of ethics and integrity-in-government
issues.”  http://www.commoncause.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).  Accuracy in Media is committed to
promoting “fairness, accuracy and balance in news reporting.”  http://www.aim.org (last visited Sept. 12,
2003).
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Science is unlikely to play an enhanced role in EPA decisions unless an
external stakeholder group applies increased pressure for scientific rigor and
integrity in the same way that other stakeholder groups lobby for other values.
Advocates for a value or perspective inside an agency draw their strength and
support from constituencies outside the agency.  One recent EPA administrator
was rumored to have asked rhetorically in an internal meeting how many votes
on Capitol Hill the scientists could deliver.  Whether true or apocryphal, that
story captures the reality that as long as scientists and those who care about
science remain unorganized, they cannot expect to match the influence of other
groups that are organized to utilize tools affecting the administrative process.
V
CONCLUSION
More influence for science is not the single answer for all that ails environ-
mental decisionmaking.  Of course, science is not totally objective, nor does it
provide definitive answers to all relevant questions.  Progress in improving gov-
ernment decisionmaking is always slow and incremental, particularly when fun-
damental changes in institutional culture and practice are at issue.  But they can
happen—slowly.  Institutional changes providing a greater infusion of economic
thinking into the regulatory process over the last three decades have improved
regulation.  In much the same way, over the next decades, a key issue that will
occupy reformers will be how to improve the scientific basis for environmental
decisions so as to marry science more productively with policy.
